Levant

Statelessness in Lebanon is been a longstanding and inter-generational issue since the creation of the Lebanese State. There is no official statelessness data in the nation, nor is there a specific system for defining statelessness. Different non-governmental sources have offered differing estimations. A study by Siren Associates and MARCH in 2019 reported 2,214 stateless individuals in Tripoli and the surrounding area, 75% of whom had a Lebanese mother. Another survey by Siren Associates with UNHCR in 2021 identified 4,088 stateless persons within just the northern governorate of Akkar, 25% of whom were found to have Dom origins. A third report by Siren Associates and INTERSOS identified 5,254 stateless persons in Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon, with nonregistration by parents as the primary cause. Through these studies, Siren Associates estimates that an average of 48% of stateless people across Lebanon were born to Lebanese fathers but are stateless because they were not registered at birth.

In 2025, UNRWA estimated 248,000 Palestinians access their services in Lebanon, representing just under half of all those registered. This is not counting the 3,000-5,000 “non-ID Palestinians” who are not registered with UNRWA nor with the Lebanese government and don’t have valid legal status in the country. The total number of stateless people in Lebanon remains unclear but it’s esitmated to be between 80,000 and 270,000 people.

This data is also very difficult to assess because the only census conducted in the country was taken in 1932 under the French Mandate. Even that census was inaccurate, as it actively excluded certain groups of Lebanese, such as Turkish Kurds and Bedouins. Statelessness is also exacerbated by the gender discriminatory nationality law, which grants citizenship at birth only if the father is Lebanese, gaps in birth registration coverage, and the ineffectiveness of legal safeguards to prevent childhood statelessness. Additionally, Lebanon neither signed nor ratified the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1954 Convention regarding the Status of Stateless Persons, developing an essential legislative gap in the legal framework and thus denying nationality to thousands of people in Lebanon.

Sources:

1. IHRC Report
2. https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon
3. https://www.sirenassociates.com/content/statelessness-in-beirut-and-mount-lebanon
4. https://www.sirenassociates.com/content/the-plight-of-the-rightless-mapping-and-understanding-statelessness-in-lebanon
5. https://help.unhcr.org/lebanon/en/steps-on-birth-registration/

Notes:

Not added but considered: registration of children is complex and onorous, and costs LBP 400,000 ($4.50)

Syria has a significant problem of statelessness due to historic mass denationalisation, gender discrimination in the nationality law, and intergenerational statelessness of Palestinians residing in the country. In 1962, a census in Al-Hasakah province stripped many Syrians of their citizenship, causing large-scale statelessness, mainly among Kurds. While it is reported that some of those who were denationalized gained citizenship through a Decree passed in 2011, no official figures exist, and a UN estimate suggests that the country is still home to 160,000 stateless persons. However, this data explicitly excludes one of the two main stateless populations, namely the estimated 438,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria. Palestinians in and from Syria, though granted rights similar to Syrian nationals by Law No. 260 of 1956, are systematically excluded from citizenship, denying them access to essential rights and state services. Gender discrimination in the Syrian nationality law worsens this issue, as nationality can only be conferred from father to child, leaving children born to Syrian mothers at risk of statelessness. Although the law contains safeguards against childhood statelessness, allowing children considered stateless at birth to acquire Syrian nationality, these are not consistently implemented.

The country is also not party to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and no statelessness determination or protection system is currently in place. This has significant impact on access to rights and essential services in the country.

Sources:

1. IHRC Report

2. UNHCR end-2024 data on statelessness: https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/insights/annexes/trends-annexes.html?situation=4 (data on stateless populations; FN provides insight into 2011 naturalization)

3. https://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/04/07/syria.kurdish.citizenship/index.html?iref=allsearch 

4. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12995174 (confirming decree granted citizenship to Hasaka Kurds denationalized by 1962 census).

5. https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/ECHOES_Issue12.pdf 

6. https://www.statelessness.eu/updates/blog/syria-has-power-change-one-biggest-statelessness-exporters-role-model-global-north (Law 260 of 1956).

With a population of 40.4 million people, Iraq is home to an estimated 47,000 stateless people. However, it is possible that the number of stateless persons in Iraq is considerably higher, as it is unclear whether this estimate accounts for all groups affected by statelessness in Iraq—separate data for the number of Bidoon, Faili Kurds and Dom affected by statelessness is not available. Iraq has ratified neither the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons norof the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It has also not ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which protect refugees at risk of statelessness. In 2010, Iraq substantially reduced the number of stateless persons and over 110,000 stateless people acquired nationality based on a new Nationality Law adopted in 2006. Though the 2006 law allows Iraqi women to confer nationality to their children on a basis equal to men, the law prevents Iraqi women from conferring their nationality to children born outside Iraq and to a non-citizen spouse, contradicting the 2005 Constitution’s guarantee of gender equality. The 2006 law also guarantees the right to Iraqi nationality to all children born in Iraq, as well as foundlings. However, these provisions are implemented discriminatorily, specifically with regard to children known to be born to two non-Iraqi parents, such as in refugee camps.

UNHCR is collaborating with the government of Iraq to facilitate the complicated and largely inaccessible civil documentation process that internally displaced persons within Iraq face. UNHCR also conducts outreach sessions for persons who are stateless or at risk of statelessness, as well as for local authorities, and provides legal counseling on the acquisition or confirmation of Iraqi citizenship, nationality, and documentation issues.

Sources:

1. IHRC Report
   UNHCR November 2021 Iraq Factsheet (prior statistic is from 2019).

2. “Article 3(a) states that nationality is passed from parent to child, thus a ‘person shall be considered Iraqi if
   . . . . he/she is born to an Iraqi father or an Iraqi mother.’ The majority of children born in the
   country obtain Iraqi nationality based on this provision.” (p.27)(2022 BUIHRC Report)

3. “Article 3 of the Nationality Law guarantees the nationality of children who are foundlings, specifically stating that ‘[a] foundling found in Iraq shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born therein.'” (p.27) (BUIHRC)

4. To replace documents, individuals and their relevant family member must travel in person to the office in their governorate of origin (i.e., where they were registered before they were displaced). This requirement is prohibitive for many reasons, including the restrictions on freedom of movement faced by IDPs, the lack of resources available for travelling, and costly administrative fees.

5. UNHCR has acknowledged that “many IDPs and returnees do not hold critical documentation, restricting access to basic services, limiting freedom of movement, and increasing the risk of arbitrary arrest.” (p. 36) (BUIHRC).

Notes:

Not added but important: Palestinians, not given Iraqi nationality to ensure abiliity to return to Palestine. Not included in UNHCR statelessness data.

Statelessness is a core aspect of Palestine population: more than half of the eight million or so Palestinians are considered to be de jure stateless persons. Partly because they are stateless, Palestinian refugees are treated more harshly than other refugees. In Palestine, citizenship is governed by the principle of jus sanguine, which gives children the citizenship of their parents. Citizenship is conferred on all people born in the Palestinian Territories from Palestinian parents and if the father holding Palestinian citizenship. If only the mother is a Palestinian citizen, the child is not recognized as a Palestinian citizen even if the mother meets the residence qualifications. In total, UNRWA provides assistance and protection for some 5,7 million Palestinian refugees in the MENA region. Impacted by historical conflicts for more than 70 years, stateless Palestinian refugees face major difficulties. In Lebanon, they are considered “foreigners” with restricted rights, denied social benefits, and restricted access to public services. As a result, many are deemed to work in the informal sector without protection and poor prospects. Nevertheless, in Jordan and Syria, Palestinian refugees are entitled to a wide scope of human rights and a right to work and access to the employment market.

The massive displacement of the Palestinian population following the formation of Israel has had significant ripple effects on nationality policy in the region as a whole. The large-scale and protracted displacement of Palestinians to the neighboring states (and around the world) makes them one of the world’s most entrenched refugee populations.

Jordan has not ratified the two United Nations treaties on statelessness (from 1954 and 1961) nor to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which protects refugees who are also at risk of statelessness. Consequently, stateless people in Jordan are especially vulnerable to economic, political, and social marginalization. Jordanian women are denied the right to confer their nationality to their children in most circumstances, with exceptions for when the father is stateless or unknown. Women can apply to transmit their nationality to their children in some circumstances, but requests are granted on an ad-hoc basis. The issue of dual nationality also affects statelessness in Jordan because dual nationality is not legal in numerous countries in the region. Therefore, there is a stigma that allowing women to pass on their nationality to their children would create potentially legally precarious cases of dual nationality that would go unrecognized in the region. Although the Bedouin are considered important to Jordan’s cultural heritage, they and other groups labeled “bidoon” (short for “without nationality”) also represent large communities in the country that struggle with de facto statelessness.

Jordan hosts the second-highest share of refugees per capita in the world. As of 2024, the country of 11 million hosted more than 1.3 million refugees – primarily Syrians, alongside Iraqis, Yemenis, Sudanese, Somalis, and others. Around 81% live in urban areas rather than camps, placing considerable pressure on Jordan’s infrastructure and host communities. Around 18% lived in Za’atari and Azraq camps, which respectively hosted around 80,000 and 40,000 Syrian refugees. Around 7,500 Syrian refugees, mainly women and children, were also stranded in Al Rukban camp in a no-go military zone on Jordan’s northeastern border, with limited access to life-saving health and nutrition services. Concerning Palestinian refugees, although the precise data is unknown, between 174,000 and 200,000 “ex-Gazans” are known to live there without documentation and are subject to severe legal restrictions, including being ineligible for Jordanian citizenship.